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Abstract    In light of currently developing and purportedly postmodern global comparative 
legal analysis (see e.g. Glenn, 2006; Menski, 2006) and recent theoretical writing about the 
ubiquitous phenomenon of law (Melissaris, 2009), this paper critically re-examines our 
somewhat self-congratulatory assumptions of the advances of postcolonial and postmodern 
legal scholarship and demonstrates that legal pluralism is actually nothing new at all.1
 I myself assumed uncritically for many years that ancient Sanskrit had no proper word 
for ‘law’, accepting others’ positivistic and orientalising assertions, without conducting 
research of my own. Once I began to research the grammar of Sanskrit law in the light of 
legal pluralism theory, however, it became rapidly apparent that early Sanskrit did in fact 
develop and begin to distinguish an increasingly large number of terms for ‘law’, though 
notably not for state law. The admittedly difficult language of early Sanskrit reflects a 
richly patterned and fluidly evolving understanding of legal pluralism within ancient Indic 
societies and cultures, showing that various interlinked legal phenomena existed and were 
thought about thousands of years before our time. Since the purported absence of a single 
 
Ancient Sanskrit sources, which can be excavated because somewhat miraculously we still 
have some of the relevant texts with their many variant readings, indicate that legal 
pluralism has existed for thousands of years as a basic fact of human life. Thus legal 
pluralism is not appropriately seen and discussed today as a contested postmodern 
phenomenon. Rather it seems to be true, as Griffiths (1986: 4) declared with some 
conviction, that legal pluralism is simply a fact. If this is correct, as seems confirmed even 
by ancient textual evidence, we have been ignoring this ancient truth at our peril and have 
simply been engaged in re-inventing wheels also in legal pluralism studies, an admittedly 
exciting but increasingly tired and overworked seam of academic knowledge about law. 
                                                 
*   This article is a revised version of a paper presented in Panel 15 of the 14th International 
Sanskrit Conference in Kyoto, 1-5 September 2009. I am grateful to Patrick Olivelle and 
Donald Davis Jr. for including it in this panel and for some critical comments. 
** Professor of South Asian Laws; eMail:  <wm4@soas.ac.uk>. 
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key word for ‘law’ in Sanskrit has given rise to rather misguided assumptions among 
scholars of Indology as well as lawyers that ancient Indians were somehow deficient in 
legal theorising and/or lacked a clear conceptualisation of ‘law’, the entire field of 
knowledge now needs to be re-examined, with some urgency, to excavate the rich plurality 
of nuanced meanings of what in English we might label as various types and 
conceptualisations of ‘law’. 
 This article demonstrates that the various Sanskrit terms that were known and used 
match to a surprising extent the well-known major manifestations of law that have been 
globally discussed, namely different forms of natural law, socio-legal norms and state-made 
positivist laws (Menski, 2006), even globalisation in a macrocosmic sense. Establishing a 
rough taxonomy of these legal terminologies in Sanskrit, the paper examines in particular to 
what extent ancient Hindu law could be seen as a natural law system, focused on the key 
concepts of rita and satya. In addition, dharma, danda, vyavahāra, ācāra and its various 
forms and other terms relevant to a deeper understanding of the richness of ancient India’s 
conceptualisations of ‘law’ are briefly examined. The conclusion from this exercise has to 
be that ancient Indians were much more plurality-conscious and legally aware than we have 
imagined so far, while retaining the somewhat idealistic presumption that self-controlled 
ordering and informal settlement of any issues would be preferable to more highly 
formalised methods. In that respect, too, ancient South Asian cultures and normative 
systems seem to share much with other non-Western legal orders. The absence of state-
centricity, in particular, remains deeply relevant for understanding the messy functioning of 






The ancient Indians were apparently much more plurality-conscious when it comes 
to understanding ‘law’ than Indologists and lawyers have given them credit for. It 
seems that Sanskrit scholars today are facing severe problems in the arduous task 
of excavating Vedic culture and laws because the preconceived notions and 
predilections of our present times are constantly interfering in the task of objective, 
rational analysis of ancient forms of law. We find it difficult to locate the lenses 
through which Vedic people perceived the world but significant fragments of the 
early texts have survived into our days and are available in print. Whether we 
properly understand their meanings and implications is an entirely different matter. 
We have no anthropological records, no fieldwork notes, only somewhat mythical 
and hence largely ‘religious’ textual representations of assumptions that inspired 
some people at that early time to produce an originally oral literature, now in front 
of us as chains of printed words that we struggle to decipher. 
 Unlike us today, Vedic people themselves probably ‘knew’ what they were 
doing when they were manipulating those texts, often by merely changing a single 
letter or sound to achieve dramatically changed outcomes.2 This was a time of 
significant changes from Vedic models of early Hinduism (if indeed one can call it 
that) to later dharma-centric manifestations. These people were certainly not 
animal-like primitive creatures; indeed many of them must have been highly 
intelligent and sophisticated individuals, able to manipulate the nuances of their 
amazingly complex language through mental gymnastics, often on-the-spot 
interventions of an allegedly magic nature. Evidently, some of these early emitters 
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of messages were not only brilliant linguists but highly skilled legal pluralists and 
skilled cultural navigators, as we might call them today (Ballard, 2007 [1994]). But 
these people experienced legal pluralism rather differently than we do today. There 
was no pressure at that early time to push for or submit to one global ‘soft’ law for 
all people made by some international convention. States were still embryonic, and 
the main focus was on religion, ethics and above all on local societal norms and 
changing processes within wider patterns of connecting humans and the universe. 
In other words, these early texts were created and manipulated within constantly 
evolving and hence fluid and contested ritual structures, which were clearly not just 
religious.  
 Then as now, humans as individuals had to make sense of the various 
manifestations all around them of what today we call interdisciplinarity and 
pluralism. Individual perceptions and, as we shall see, individual conscience and 
consciousness, became critical epistemological tools. Culture, power, economics, 
law, everything was recognised as being interlinked, as the early concept of karma 
so clearly indicates (Tull, 1989). As Olivelle (2006a) and others indicate in 
ongoing painstaking text-based research, it seems that Vedic Indians and those who 
followed them practised early forms of ‘living law’ (Ehrlich, 1936) in which border 
crossing between different religious and secular aspects was constantly necessary, 
recognising the ubiquitous presence of both, as well as their internal pluralities.  
 Some academic shadow boxing continues to occur over the ‘theological 
rhetoric’ (Olivelle, 2006a: 184) of the nature and extent of dependency of ancient 
Indic legal concepts on Vedic religious models. This struggle occurs among 
today’s scholars, who clearly also have their own agenda. The polycentric tree of 
Hinduism (Lipner, 1994: xv) has many parts that remain puzzling, but the whole 
tree clearly exists and has more ancient roots than any excavation work can cope 
with. Common people, in Vedic times as well as today, would know very well 
what their own Hinduism is like, but will have remained mostly uneducated about 
the roots of Hindu law that one can trace in Sanskrit texts. In desperate efforts to 
make sense of an allegedly glorious and certainly idealised past, encapsulated now 
in that dirty and polluting word hindutva (‘Hinduness’), reflecting efforts to make 
sense of one’s own roots in today’s often highly nationalistic contexts, many 
Indians and their more or less scholarly and highly politicised spokespersons 
simply like to believe today in certain myths. That is of course much easier than 
textual excavation work. Hence many Hindus today assume that their law just fell 
from heaven one day into the lap of humanity, basically that this ‘law’ came from 
one big God at some point, as happened to other fortunate and/or chosen people, 
one believes. This early law was then remembered by some special holy men with 
long hair and funny clothes, often now depicted in films and other media in various 
shades of orange colours. Such simple and convenient images serve to reflect the 
broadly familiar transition from somewhat divinely revealed knowledge or Truth 
(śruti) to humanly remembered knowledge or truth (smriti). The main trouble (or 
beauty, depending on the reader’s position) remains, however, that this entire 
process of genesis and reconstruction must be characterised as marked by deep 
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internal pluralities. For Hindus as a whole there is neither one God in whom 
everyone has to believe nor one special human that received this Truth and passed 
it on to others. In typical positivist lemming mentality, however, partly induced by 
colonial interventions, it is taught – most prominently by today’s telegurus and 
many others - that such ancient rules and their interpretations by special people 
(who tend to be men, of course) just need to be followed now by Hindu believers. 
Most Hindus are thus denying themselves the agency to think for themselves and to 
be creative makers of rules for their own lives. Mental dependency on gurus has 
become a common form of Hindu positivist infection and is glocally manifested all 
over the globe. Dharma has become a symbol of obedience rather than a key to 
dynamic self-definition and creative self-realisation. Brahmins still claim to be in 
charge of everything. Positivised crowds of Indians and many foreign scholars let 
them get away with such assertions. Among the latter, of course, those who argue 
against ‘tradition’ or ‘religion’ of any form find such images rather useful to 
simply uphold the dodgy construction of ancient threatening monsters with 
tentacles that reach deep into present times. 
 The real story (which of course we will never be able to excavate) is certainly 
not so simple and gives in my assessment much more power to Hindu individuals 
than gurus and other power brokers wish to admit and acknowledge. Not only is 
religion a huge business, clearly since Vedic times. Later wishful Hindu thoughts 
about early Golden Ages, about legal genesis and progression (or rather 
deterioration, as we shall see) are equally clearly influenced and polluted by 
religious politics and engineering, ultimately now strengthening the monotheistic 
trends of our times, fearful that ‘others’ around the roughly 800 million or so 
‘Hindus’ in the world today may have a better system and might take over, whether 
through love-induced conversions, missionary activities, or jihad and the sword. 
There are indications that this kind of competitive scenario, involving fear of ‘the 
other’ and feelings of superiority on the part of a dominant group or elite under 
challenge, was a key issue even in Vedic times. Chattopadhyaya (2007: 146) notes: 
 
The earliest expression of an idea of irreconcilable hostility is articulated in 
the hymns of the Rgveda, the earliest available Vedic text, placing the 
despicable dasyu and the dasa (non-Aryans) against arya, the representative 
of the respectable society. 
 
What, however, is a ‘respectable society’ if there are many competing belief 
structures and value systems in the world, then as now? The above vision of an 
early form of ‘war on terror’ was further complicated by the emerging presence of 
Buddhists, Jainas and others who challenged the very basics of the Vedic 
worldviews and of related expectations about how humans should lead their lives. 
Vedic Hindus must have been deeply upset when people came along to challenge 
their worldview as bogus and, as Marx would later say, ‘opium for the masses’, 
well before there was concern with such masses, because Vedic religious structures 
seem to be based primarily on a tiny literate elite as ritual actors. Vedic notions of 
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dharma, right action, were focused on correct ritual action by those few who could 
handle such complex tasks. The massification of dharma occurred later, and it 
reflects changing meanings and implications, as we shall see. Reading Olivelle 
(2006a) together with a new study on India’s ‘composite culture’ (Chattopadhyaya, 
2007) was thus an eye-opener about the stresses caused, today as in Vedic times, 
by the presence of ‘others’ and the challenges posed by the ubiquitous phenomenon 
(Melissaris, 2009) of legal pluralism. 
 Well before the postmodern age, then, as I always suspected but never properly 
explained and spelled out, ancient Indians did not need the troubling experiences of 
modernity to come up with what we today, self-flattering and proud of our own 
sophistication, tend to see as ‘post-modern’ thoughts about different perspectives 
of our ‘gaze’ (oh what a fashionable word this, in turn, has become!), 
fragmentations of existence, the limits of law, let alone the limited reach of the 
state and its often aggressively expressed methods of governance. It is becoming 
clearer now that Vedic people’s scepticism towards the possibilities of avoiding 
chaos and ultimate destruction, their apprehensions about the scope for dignified 
survival, must have been rather different in detail from those we face today. 
However, certain structural elements can be recognised and compared. Vedic 
scepticism and pluralism are certainly not the same as postmodern pluralities and 
conflicts in terms of substance. But in principle, the exposure to legal pluralism 
itself and the conflicts that this phenomenon inevitably imposes on human 
existence were manifestly already part of the Vedic experience of life.  
 The main emphasis of the present article is therefore to show that this conflict-
ridden plurality is quite clearly reflected in ancient Sanskrit terminology, our main 
evidence from those early days. We may have changed the culture-specific 
language used and the terminology applied to grapple with the challenges of legal 
pluralism, but many of the still confused and confusing pluralist tensions and 
problems that humans suffer today as legal beings were already ‘big issues’ in 
Vedic times. Can we, however, excavate such legal histories today without being 
accused of engaging in fiction and mythmaking?  
 
  
What do we know, and what do we need to know 
in the light of pluralist analysis? 
 
Without wishing to slip into a Maine-type evolutionary model (Maine, 1861), I 
suggested so far in my writing on Hindu law that, starting from a macrocosmic 
natural law focus, encompassed in rita/satya, there has over a vast time span been 
enormous dynamism, involving a gradual shift of emphasis towards the socio-legal 
and more individualised, microcosmic concept of dharma with its many specialised 
sub-categories within Hindu law as a conceptual entity (Menski, 2003). I do not see 
that this trajectory of Hindu law is significantly different in principle from the 
complex jurisprudential images constructed for general jurisprudence (see 
Freeman, 2001).  The focus on dharma (basically the duty to do the right thing at 
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any point of one’s life) as a key concept is widely accepted by text-based scholars 
and other commentators on Hindu law, though Davis (2004: 12) has rightly 
suggested that the boundaries of Hindu law can perhaps be determined more 
exactly by examining another key term:  
 
Ācāra, localized standards of law sometimes called customary law, is 
dharma in practice, continually recreated manifestations of dharma in 
particular local contexts. Ācāras may conflict with each other and still be 
dharma in their respective contexts. 
 
Dharma is thus the central normative element and ācāra can be seen as its 
praxiological manifestation. The above quote beautifully encapsulates the inbuilt 
dynamism of Hindu law as a living entity, and represents well what my most recent 
cohort of students has learnt to understand and perhaps even enjoy as ‘pop’, law as 
‘a plurality of pluralities’. This even more intense representation of dynamic 
pluralism than found in Menski (2006: 612) in triangular form now appears as a 
kite structure, in which globalisation, international norms and human rights 
concerns constitute a fourth plurality of pluralities (Menski, 2009). 
 The two models require some brief explanations for a wider readership here. 
The triangle, taken in modified form Menski (2006: 612) where law as societal 
norms was basically designated as corner 1, state law as corner 2 and 
religion/ethics/natural law as corner 3, seeks to express the interconnected nature of 
all law, with legal pluralism at the centre of the structure, composed of overlapping 
elements of law in various conjunctions with each other. This model was gradually 
devised while I relied mainly on Chiba (1986) and was not yet ready to add 
international law into this model (see Menski, 2006: 3-24): 
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Figure 1.  Triangle  
 




The more recent kite model below is so far only published in a Japanese journal 
that is difficult to access (Menski, 2009) but makes an appearance also in essays 
currently published in Italy, India and Bangladesh. The fourth corner represents 
now international law and human rights as a further internally plural element. It is 
important to note that the numbering of the earlier three corners has now been 
changed, so that natural law in the form of religion/ethics represents corner 1, 
social norms form corner 2 and positive law is now located in corner 3, with corner 
4 given to international norms or, indeed, new natural law. This, it appears to me 
presently, reflects better the broadly historical sequence in which these types of law 
have tended to enter into the fray. At the same time, these various elements of law 
are highly interactive, internally plural and always reactive, so the existing image 
with its somewhat more rigid lines seems a little misleading; there ought to be 
broken lines everywhere here, too, and we are working on new computer-based 
graphics to express this ‘pop’ structure more adequately. But this is what is found 
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Figure 2. Kite Model 
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Source: Menski (2009) 
 
 
To return to the ancient Sanskrit texts, only slightly later than in the earliest layers, 
and thus together with dharma and ācāra, we find important further legal concepts 
like danda, vyavahāra and nyāya, which might all be taken to indicate more 
explicit state involvement (Verstaatlichung) in legal management and would thus 
be placed close to corner 3 of the kite model above. However, as I have explained 
in detail elsewhere (Menski, 2003; 2007) the real picture will have been closer to 
continued reservations about state involvement, hence continuing pulls towards 
Entstaatlichung. This means that these somewhat later Sanskrit concepts signify 
various internally pluralised hybrid entities rather than stagnant indications of more 
or less complete state control. This means and implies first of all that much more 
reliance was in Hindu legal history directed towards what I have called ‘assisted 
self-controlled ordering (Menski, 2003: 107). Since ancient Hindu law never 
seemed to accept the more or less total dominance of the state, as modernity-
infected legal scholars and Indologists often tend to do, positivistic readings and 
interpretations of the ancient grammar of Sanskrit law are in my view quite 
misguided. They are polluted by the ongoing global fetishisation of legal 
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positivism and are infected by various forms of authoritarian control mania. 
Ancient Hindu law, however, relied really more on self-controlled ordering 
(Menski, 2003) and cannot be understood properly without taking that rather 
informal and hence elusive trope seriously. Excavating such informal legal 
structures, which extend to mental processes, clearly poses additional challenges to 
legal scholarship. 
 In ancient India, then, the major boundary in dealing with ‘living law’ is not, as 
the creator of this concept (Ehrlich, 1936) observed in his own time and with 
reference to some remote corner of the Habsburg empire, the dynamic interaction 
of state law and local social norms, but primarily management of the combination 
of various forms and aspects of natural laws (perhaps largely religious) and social 
norms (probably in large part secular). This includes, as Olivelle (2006a) so rightly 
stresses, and many writers would endorse, local and family customs, which are 
another ‘pop’ structure. The primary interaction of living law in ancient India 
occurs then somewhere between points 3 and 1 in the triangle of law (Menski, 
2006: 612) or rather between points 1 and 2 in the kite model above, which does 
make more sense in view of the conceptual evidence. Given such inherently 
dynamic hybridisations of law, there were clearly culture-specific kinds of deeply 
plural legal scenarios in existence thousands of years before our time. Of course we 
can only ‘see’ this if we apply pluralist methodologies of analysis. Whether these 
kinds of laws are then ‘religious’ or ‘secular’ is a different question, considered 
further below, and remains of course a matter of deeply subjective assessment. 
 So much seemed reasonably certain also earlier, namely that no prominent word 
for secular, rational ‘state law’ developed in early Sanskrit. The term commonly 
used in Hindu law, much later of course, is the Arabic/Urdu term qānūn. There is 
of course a huge time gap between Vedic times and the emergence of the 
threatening Turuskas (Turks) in the eleventh century (Chattopadhyaya, 2007: 150). 
Yet there will never have been a legal void in between. So what exactly is or was 
the nature of early Indic law as expressed in Sanskrit terminology? Pre-empting 
charges that this is merely another form of ‘Menski’s law’, I argue 
prophylactically, first of all, that surely law was not entirely absent, since no 
society is without law (Moore, 1978). We must also note, however, that important 
eurocentric legal scholars sought to argue that ‘primitive communities’ simply have 
no proper law. A few years ago I shocked the incoming cohort of law students at 
the National Law School in Bangalore and their teachers when I proved that we can 
still blame none other than Hart (1961: 89; 1994: 91) for such rather obvious forms 
of myopia. It is there in clear print, no need for excavation. One just has to 
carefully re-read this almost canonical text and the misguided message jumps at the 
reader like a gremlin. 
 If we can now perhaps take it as an axiom that no human society is without 
some form of law, however informal, our contemporary tendency to speak of 
‘lawless’ people and places is also highly questionable. This now relates more to 
discussions of ‘law and morality’ and the key issue of conflicting values. All we 
are saying in such loose language of ‘lawlessness’ is that we do not agree with 
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what those ‘others’ are doing in the name of law. This often constitutes simply a 
reflection of our own biases, but this language use also hides neo-imperialistic 
efforts to impose ‘our’ eurocentric values on ‘others’ in the name of global 
discourses. Current wars on terror and constant attempts to dictate to others how 
they should live their lives, mixed with much (even if partly justified) indignity and 
approbation of how certain people choose to live and conduct themselves produce 
such deeply questionable terminologies. Not much change from colonial times, 
really, though 9/11 and 7/7 clearly played a role here, too, and increased the heat of 
conflict. Ongoing struggles of this kind today cloud our intellectual capacity to 
engage in plurality-conscious global legal theory, which could of course never be 
value-free and thus itself creates tensions. A bad law in the eyes of some of us is 
still a law, and it might actually be the right law from the perception of those who 
disagree with us. So we fight over everything, gender, women, polygamy, dress 
codes, to name but a few flashpoints. This is not to say, of course, that total 
aberrations do not exist and are not possible. This, too, the ancient Indians knew 
very well, otherwise we would not have the massive epic dramas of the 
Mahābhārata, which are elaborate illustrations of ferocious battles over good and 
evil. As a grandchild of Nazi Germany, I need not say more about this kind of issue 
here. Together with much British evidence of systematic discrimination, unearthed 
every year in our courses on Ethnic Minorities and the Law (and of course all 
around us), this may well be one major reason why my own research reflects and 
stresses the vast scope for self-controlled ordering and the techniques of legal 
reconstruction and ‘inner migration’, another psychological phenomenon which 
state-centric lawyers conveniently choose to ignore. Awareness of such worrying 
aberrations in the name of the law induces deep suspicions about blind belief in 
Verstaatlichung or international normative monism. None of the four corners of the 
kite on its own, this confirms, can be trusted to produce Stammler’s ‘richtiges 
Recht’ (Menski, 2006: 133-4). It appears that the ancient Indians knew such basic 
truths while they searched for an appropriate terminology in Sanskrit. 
 The above passage demonstrates that such excursions into current politics of 
law and scholarship remain highly relevant for handling the challenges of 
excavating Sanskrit law and Vedic pluralism. They impact on our vision and shape 
our tools for excavation. So if we wish to tackle the task of excavating ancient 
Indic laws today, what exactly do we need to know about the nature of early law as 
expressed in Sanskrit terminology? First of all, as we saw, such law is clearly not 
state law, nothing unusual for comparative lawyers. But if law was not ever absent, 
there can simply not have been a kind of legal void, as positivistic scholars like 
Lingat (1973) seemed to imagine and Sir Henry Maine’s (1861) historical approach 
also seems to stipulate. These types of outdated scholarship, based on 
civilisationally evolutionist thinking, are now in need of serious revision, since we 
recognise with increasing clarity that law is (and hence was always) ubiquitous, as 
the latest study on legal pluralism (Melissaris, 2009) so elaborately posits, without 
really telling us anything new.  
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 Finding messy pluralism as a fact of human life, in ancient times as well as 
now, is therefore not just a professional hazard for legal pluralists, those who can 
see how pluralities of law work themselves out in all human lives at all times. It 
critically affects all lawyers, and it critically impacts on the work of area studies 
specialists who inevitably have to work across time and space. Moreover it is also 
simply part of the challenge of human life itself, of gradually growing up as a 
thinking human being, becoming aware of the various diversities around us and our 
own - mostly rather limited - role in making a difference.  
 Early law tends to be seen as something religious. Indeed the basic concept of 
natural law in its eurocentric manifestations suggests this, reflected in the work of 
major early scholars like St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-74). He was first of all a 
Christian natural lawyer, not consciously a global theorist or a legal pluralist. But 
his model of various types of natural law clearly goes beyond the realm of religion 
and connects the corners of whatever pluralist structure of law we may envisage 
today. As indicated, assessing whether a whole complex system of rules and 
processes can be seen as something ‘religious’ rather than ‘legal’ and/or ‘secular’, 
is a difficult challenge. If globally there are so many competing religious claims, in 
efforts to remain realistic and plurality-conscious, one tends to become agnostic as 
a global pluralist.  
 Reporting here about recent findings among legal theorists regarding the 
relationship of law and religion, I relate this to ongoing, fascinating indological 
analysis of the third generation, an endeavour ‘formed by an attitude ready to learn 
and to be crossfertilized’ (Panikkar, 1985: xii). Both sets of scholarship are still 
constantly thrown back to the arduous global key issue of what we actually mean 
by ‘law’ and also now, quite pointedly, to what scholars, including Indologists, 
may mean at global level by ‘religion’. It is surely not sufficient to simply assume 
that everything written in Sanskrit or the whole body of Hindu knowledge or law 
expressed in Sanskrit is just ‘religious’ (Menski, 2002: 108).3
 To achieve greater clarity, it is necessary here to explore in more depth the 
extent of the religious nature of early Hindu legal pluralism and our understanding 
of it. My published work (Menski, 2001, 2003; 2006) suggests throughout that, for 
early Hindu law as much as in modern Hindu family law and even in India’s 
constitutional law regulation today, the internalised expectation of self-controlled 
ordering among Hindus and today’s Indian citizens generally is a central ingredient 
of the phenomena we call ‘law’. Whether this is a matter of religion or more of 
secular characteristics is actually not an either/or issue; there will always be 
elements of ‘religion’ and of ‘secular’ law in this pluralist bundle of interlinkages. 
In our new ‘pop’ paradigm at SOAS, both ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ elements are 
always part of this internally plural structure of law. It may be in different mixes or 
percentages, but none of the two is ever entirely absent, though we may see many 
efforts to deny this. 
  
 This intrinsically interconnected vision is of course radically different from the 
approaches taken by supposedly rational state-centric positivism, such as French 
laïcism on the extreme side of the secular spectrum. This model is supposed to 
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have been received in Turkish law, for example, and many other places, but 
significantly not properly in India, which has its own (albeit of course contested) 
definition of ‘secularism’ as ‘equidistance of the state from all religions (Larson, 
2001). Globally, post-Enlightenment scholarship has somehow come to believe 
that law and religion can be divided, that politics and law can be segregated and put 
into separate boxes. While secularism itself is manifestly also an ancient concept, it 
appears more prominently only in its post-Enlightenment, disconnected form as a 
separate entity, technically a matter of non-establishment in the management of 
State-Church relations. Such separate and segregated secularism appears to be 
mainly a later phenomenon in human history. For a long time it was linked to 
religious, also explicitly Christian, concepts, and thus was never value-neutral (see 
earlier the lex humana of St. Thomas Aquinas). If in the West today we still 
assume and virtually insist that some things can just be ‘value-free’ and ‘rational’, 
most often purportedly ‘secular’, we seem to be committing huge errors of 
judgment, therefore. No form of law seems ever value-neutral. Secularism, like 
atheism, is then just another form of ‘religion’, a ‘pop’ phenomenon like law and 
another academic conundrum that will keep us busy forever. 
 The Vedic expectation of dynamic alertness on the part of those ‘who know’, 
thus stereotypically essentially the Brahmins (and those that managed to act or 
think like them) in every moment of their existence, was supposed to stimulate and 
influence various patterns of ritual activity and socio-legal behaviour. It is surely a 
religious phenomenon, but at the very same time it is also practical and secular; 
both these aspects are interconnected and both have legal implications. The Vedic 
‘pop’ culture thus constantly jumps out of the analyst’s box, confounds restrictive 
analysis and would deeply irritate positivist efforts to rein it in. As we shall see 
below, this elusive evasion and dynamic boundary crossing occurs primarily in 
Vedic law because rita and satya co-exist from the start as two interconnected 
forms of Truth. This linguistically marked internal plurality of the most basic point 
of the entire structure then also impacts critically on how we deal with law and 
legal analysis in all other later respects. Thus, for example, methods of informal 
dispute settlement, encapsulated eventually in the technical term vyavahāra, 
comprise any form of removal of doubt about dharma (Menski, 2007). Any form, 
that means, from a mental process in one’s mind to a formal court hearing and 
probably even armed warfare. Because this broad and internally plural term was 
generally but misleadingly translated as ‘dispute settlement’, even more narrowly 
as ‘judicial proceedings’ (Lariviere, 1989), we have simply become blindfolded by 
our own proclaimed expertise and have miserably failed to understand Vedic ‘pop’ 
culture.   
  Discussing this particular later Hindu concept of ‘removal of doubt’ opened it 
up for pluralist analysis (see Menski, 2007). In light of that particular examination, 
the primarily internalised expectation of self-controlled ordering appears now even 
more like a fitting internally plural corollary to the central Hindu concept of 
interlinkedness. It is one of the elements of the dynamising motor that moves the 
typically slow engine of the Hindu train through history. If others can speak of 
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‘Hindu economics’ and the related phenomenon of a slow Hindu growth rate, legal 
scholars should be at ease with the vision that Hindu dispute settlement is an 
extremely subtle phenomenon subject to many imponderables, clearly another 
plurality of pluralities.  
 If this analytical approach is correct, this means that none of the legal entities 
examined here in Sanskrit law could ever be presumed to have existed in ‘pure’ 
form or in isolation. Moreover, and this is an absolutely crucial point to stress, no 
element or entity could ever prevail to the exclusion of all other phenomena or 
considerations. This  was already alluded to above. Everything is found on that 
triangle or kite, or we might imagine a train through history; everything is invisibly 
and visibly linked. Or we could think of an ancient serpent that changes its skin 
every so often but lives on. Everything discussed here contributes to the various 
dynamisms involved in the process of excavating Sanskrit law and its pluralisms. 
 Whatever image one uses, in the pluralist field called ‘law’, also in Vedic times, 
there was then never just one element or ‘entity’, as I called it to express the fuzzy 
boundary of what may be seen as ‘law’ (Menski, 2006: 184). Notably, the term 
‘entity’ is actually used quite a lot in writing on law, confirming that it is a 
convenient passe-partout. If law anywhere was and is always a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon, never just one thing or concept on its own and operating in isolation, 
analysts need to work extra hard to understand the resulting complex processes of 
how people in their respective own times, places and cultural contexts managed the 
internally plural relationship of those entities. That does not prevent us from 
thinking of what Allott (1980: 2) identified as LAW as a global phenomenon, Law 
as a particular legal system, or ‘law’ as a label for a single rule, especially if we use 
the English language with its multi-facetted register of meanings for this little 
word. Again, all these concepts co-exist as ‘pop’ phenomena; any one does not 
exclude or supersede the other. 
 What appears to have happened within the complex field of Hindu law, then, 
over time, is that the searchlight of analysis and the focus of concern have 
gradually shifted from one legally relevant concept to another, never making the 
other concepts and sub-categories of this complex system non-existent or totally 
irrelevant. Our dynamic gaze has just changed the focus. Thus today, most Hindus 
will not even know any longer what the ancient Vedic concept of invisible Truth as 
rita means, and how it can be distinguished from the visible Truth identified by the 
term satya. The former term has simply become embedded in the plurality 
encompassed by the better known key term of dharma. Hindus will, however, 
instantly recognise the implications of such deeper ‘pop’ structures within Hindu 
law, provided scholars explain this to them in language that they can follow. As 
elsewhere, meaningful communication across time, space and cultures is only 
possible if we chose languages and media that can be understood by others.  
 Sanskrit, as we know, is not one of the easiest languages nor is it mainly a 
spoken language. The language of law that needs to be excavated from the ancient 
Sanskrit texts, given that they are not legal documents, is so evidently full of 
intricacies that we still struggle today over basic concepts. An additional challenge 
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is to translate such complex plural meanings and messages into easily 
communicable sound bites that a global community of legally focused theoretical 
scholarship can then build into structures of comparative legal theory. I argue that 
ancient Sanskritic legal concepts can contribute much to such global legal 
scholarship by being confident and candid about their own internal plurality, 
instead of trying to fit into purportedly uniform global models. The resulting ‘pop’ 
images are amazingly colourful and meaningful, grounding and confirming the 
well-known basic principle that law remains everywhere a culture-specific part of 
human life in all its various aspects (Menski, 2006). It also confirms, as Olivelle 
(2006a) so convincingly shows, that the role of custom in law generally, and in 
Hindu law in particular, is much larger than lawyers, judges, and the various types 
of religious leaders around the world (not only hindutva-walas) wish to 
acknowledge.  
 By ‘law’, however, at least in English parlance today, one seems to mean first 
of all ‘state law’. Evidently, that instant mental association remains problematic. 
Such dominant presumptions of our positivism-centric days have clearly impacted 
on the methods and strategies which Sanskrit scholars in the past and also now are 
employing in their analysis of ancient texts. As a result, a rather too brief focus of 
the searchlight on early Sanskrit sources will yield no findings about ‘law’, simply 
because positive law was then not a prominent phenomenon. But it was not absent, 
for example one of the earliest functions of a ‘good’ Indic ruler would have been to 
sponsor the huge Vedic sacrifices and thus to contribute to the maintenance of 
global Order. If state law does not play a directly visible prominent role in early 
Sanskrit law, this means that as analysts we have to be super-conscious of what 
else there may have been. To reiterate, the ancient Hindu cultural space was simply 
not a lawless arena. Potential positivist pollutions by our own current thinking need 
to be constantly identified to re-adjust and sharpen our lenses for the possibly 
rather fuzzy boundaries and resulting plural interpretations of relevant ancient 
Sanskrit terms.  
 The main purpose of this particular article remains therefore a fresh attempt to 
explore and explain the various key terms used in early Sanskrit to identify certain 
aspects of law as a foundation for further discussions about their theoretical and 
practical relevance and connectivity, aware of disruptions of our thoughts 
particularly by positivistic concepts and the difficult current debates about the 
boundaries of religion/secularism. Accepting that in earlier times religion played a 
large part in law, as indicated above, does not automatically create or endorse 
claims that everything was governed by religion. Let us also be clear about that 
from the start. 
 The article originally planned to move from key concepts of the Vedic period to 
a focus on dharma as self-controlled ordering in the highly idealised Golden Age 
and/or ‘classical period’ of Hindu law. It then sought to examine the various 
concepts brought in to support self-controlled ordering in less ideal and less perfect 
later circumstances, aware that all the time various notions of chaos are opposed to 
the ideal concepts of Order/order that can be identified. As I researched relevant 
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material and began to write this article, it soon became obvious that there is so 
much to say about legal pluralism in Vedic Sanskrit law itself that the later sections 
are going to have to be very short indeed. 
 
 
The Vedic core: Focus on śruti, rita, satya and early dharma 
 
 
Law and Nature: How - and whether - to identify the conceptual core 
 
In the preface to my current main study of Hindu law (Menski, 2003: xvi), I 
indicated that ‘[t]here may be something like an essential conceptual core, but in 
the case of Hindu law, even that core has remained so flexible, diffuse and 
internally diverse that we do well to think and speak of ‘unity in diversity’ rather 
than imagining a fixed, unified Hindu system’. Today, then, we speak about ‘pop’. 
Such pluralising elements seem to have been ignored by other writers on Hindu 
law or are treated as confusing history with theology (Olivelle, 2006a: 172). Here I 
place legal pluralism as manifest within early Sanskrit law firmly onto the table of 
analysis and re-examine it in more depth. Sanskritists have been tempted, as I 
noted earlier, ‘to pick out certain aspects of rules as placative evidence of what 
Hindu law was or is, ignoring the multidimensional internal contests within it’ 
(Menski, 2003: xvi).  
 I ran into this kind of trouble while preparing the various entries on Hindu law 
as one of the area editors for the recently published Oxford International 
Encyclopedia of Legal History (OIELH; see Katz 2009), specifically when 
Professor Stephanie Jamison (2009) insisted that Vedic law was not a form of 
natural law, and that this term had no place in her entry. The present article is 
partly a reaction to her strong objections and an effort to clarify the contested 
points. In the process, I found much more than I expected and am extremely 
grateful to my learned colleague for motivating me to dig deeper. This article 
would not be what it is without Jamison’s initial protest about the role of religion 
and Nature in Vedic law.  
 As an indologist, I first took this concept on board after studying Miller (1985). 
Re-reading Miller’s enlightening study and specifically the substantial Foreword 
by Raimundo Panikkar (1985: xi-xix), I note his explicit reference to Miller’s 
explosion of old views like ‘the naturalism of the Vedas’ (Panikkar, 1985: xiii). I 
show further below that one cannot simply conflate such suspect orientalist 
‘naturalism’ with lawyers’ concept of ‘natural law’, which itself has many different 
meanings. That may explain the more recent explosions of scholarly disapproval, 
indicating lack of interdisciplinarity and preference for a particular worldview 
about ‘religion’, thereby causing tensions about understanding legal ‘pop’ 
structures in ancient India. But let us first turn to the key terminology in Sanskrit. 
  
Śruti  
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The concept of śruti refers to a process of textual transmission and indicates also 
exalted status of the textual foundations of Vedic law. Since the word links to the 
root for ‘to hear’, it has indeed been tempting to imagine that Vedic literature is a 
form of revealed sacred scripture made by some all-powerful God, a text that one 
day just fell from heaven or was graciously given to humans much before 
computers were invented. These are polluting thoughts indeed. Proferes (2009) in 
his marvellous OIELH entry on ‘Śruti’ clearly identifies the various Vedic and later 
nuances of early Hindu perceptions of how śruti can be understood in relation to 
rita and the concept of ‘Truth’. This brings out quite clearly that early Hindus 
differed dramatically on whether the basic foundations were made by a God 
(īśvara), according to the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika approaches and various later 
theistic schools, or whether it was simply a ‘cosmic imperative’ (Proferes, 2009: 
344), eternal and apaurusheya, as according to the Pūrva Mīmāmsā approach (on 
which see now Francavilla, 2006). The entry thus indicates and confirms that the 
very foundations of Hindu law are plural, forever invisible, and hence open to 
belief and speculation. For Hindus, there is never just any unchallenged ultimate 
truth claim of a monotheistic nature. We cannot really go further in excavation, it 
seems. That foundational plurality underpins and explains the entire internally 
pluralistic nature of later Hindu law and of Hinduism itself as a collection of 
entities rather than one fixed whole. We clearly know this, but should never forget 
this ‘pop’ element while dealing with any matter of Hindu law. Perhaps, however, 
the combination of the words ‘Hindu’ and ‘law’ automatically sets off restrictive 
perceptions in our minds, confirming that we lack plurality-consciousness and 
urgently need to open what one of my current students has called ‘our fish eyes’. 
So if scholars of Hinduism like Gavin Flood (2004: 35) discuss various 
conceptualisations of the Veda, we simply have to read, expressed in more 
fashionable language, ‘between the lines’: 
 
The Veda is regarded by some Hindus as a timeless revelation which is not 
of human authorship…, is eternal, and contains all knowledge, while others 
regard it to be the revelation of God. It was received or ‘seen’ by the ancient 
seers…who communicated it to other men and was put together in its 
present form by the sage Vyāsa. Indeed, a popular definition of a Hindu is 
somebody who accepts the Veda as revelation. This idea is not without 
problems and exceptions, but indicates the undoubted importance of the 
Veda in Hindu self-perception and self-representation. 
 
Despite the scholarly rider in the last sentence of this quote, it seems that the 
damage is done in our myopic minds, even if we are desperately seeking to avoid 
it. History and theology have been conflated; a theistically slanted mirror image of 
Hinduism has been produced in which the Veda, ‘put together’ by an ancient sage, 
appears like the basic rule book for all Hindus. The skeleton of another Hindu law-
maker rattles in the cupboard. While I myself emphasised the historically 
unquestionable role of the Veda as a conceptual foundation for the later emergence 
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of Hindu law concepts (Menski, 2003: 78), I also warned, almost in the same 
breath, against facile assertions about the divine authority of the Vedas (Menski, 
2003: 79) and Napoleonic visions of grandeur. Can one say more? Does one need 
to say more? Let us re-examine the closely related concept of rita first. 
 
Over to rita 
Whether theistic or non-theistic preferences are brought in and are thought to 
prevail (evidently, over time and space different types of Hindus thought about this 
in different ways) the concept of rita itself seems to mean first of all something 
quite essentially true and good. This ‘Order’, with a big ‘O’, in the macrocosmic 
sense, already strays in Vedic times into microcosmic dimensions. I think that 
cannot be denied. Jamison (2009: 150) refers to this term as ‘[t]he most charged 
Vedic word’ and quite properly treats it as very complex and much more than 
either ‘cosmic order’ or ‘truth’, namely: 
 
the capturing, in words, of the true principles that undergird the functioning 
of the cosmos and therefore of human society. It is thus both a reflection of 
reality, standing for reality itself, and a product of human mental and verbal 
activity, conferring certain powers on the human with the insight to discern 
the hidden truth. This notion is reflected in the later Indian institution of 
satyakriyā (act of truth). 
 
If this is not first of all an acknowledgement that Nature and Law may be seen and 
treated as interlinked entities, I shall probably have to get new lenses. Jamison 
(2009: 150) moves on rather swiftly to tell us that ‘[a]longside such grand 
conceptual schemata, Vedic texts also contain early hints of the elaborate systems 
of minute regulations of everyday life’, characteristic of later dharma texts. So in 
the few words allowed by an encyclopaedia entry, we find here a brief reflection of 
emerging Vedic legal pluralism, in which the cosmos and human society are 
clearly perceived as interlinked, while humans are beginning to devise methods to 
understand the world around them and to regulate relations with each other. 
Nothing new, but central concepts are flagged up. Considering the links between 
Man and Nature, also reflected in the ritual focus of the Vedic literature as a whole, 
it remains puzzling why Jamison refused insertion of the term ‘natural law’ into 
this entry to help comparative lawyers in understanding Vedic law. 
 As a comparative analyst, I see from the words used that natural law 
conceptualisations (‘the cosmos’, ‘hidden truth’) are quite central in this particular 
entry. So we seem to disagree simply on what to call this kind of law, not on 
whether the phenomenon itself exists or not. We have excavated it, but do not 
know how to call what we found. Are we just refusing to be cross-fertilised, as 
Panikkar (1985: xii) would say? It is absolutely clear and also implied by Jamison 
(2009) that already in Vedic times the searchlight is beginning to be focused on 
human efforts to live a ‘good life’ and to understand human existence more deeply. 
Surely, this would not occur in isolation from cosmic Truth. This invisibly 
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connected scenario reflects, again, St. Thomas Aquinas and his lex humana (see 
Menski, 2006: 143-4). Jamison’s wonderful work on early Indian women ‘between 
the lines’ (Jamison, 2006) clearly shows that socio-legal concerns, including 
gender issues, were already in Vedic times popping up all over the place, like 
mushrooms. They did not pop up for feminist reasons, but manifestly because 
Nature has given women a very special place – men could not give birth, they 
could only contribute to it, and nobody knew how a new human was ‘made’. Given 
that the comprehensive search for knowledge in all fields of life was clearly ‘on’, 
the emerging focus on some form of ‘ultimate knowledge’ as part of this 
development is becoming strongly evident in the Vedic texts. The exalted status 
given at first to ‘those who know’ – or claim to know, warns the cynic in me – is 
also quite clearly emerging from such texts. That is typical of all early human 
systems of thought, and it is wonderful for Sanskritists to have all those Sanskrit 
sources that confirm such epistemological processes so clearly. The orality-focused 
Africans’ struggle to prove that they have been thinking humans, too, is much 
tougher in comparison. While Africans faced and still face denial of acceptance of 
their ancient philosophies and of their laws as ‘law’ (Menski, 2006, chapter 6), the 
special place given to a literate elite is also found in early Chinese cultures. Later it 
is replicated in early Islamic law, where the emerging effort (ijtihad) to understand 
God’s words and their meaning after the Prophet’s death in 632 AD eventually 
gave rise to an entirely new ‘legal’ system with many familiar elements and 
ingredients, another pop structure. Comparative law teaches us also that all humans 
are alike, searching for deeper meanings and excavating culture-specific truths to 
the best of their abilities. 
  
Challenges to rita 
For, as today, there are many limits to what humans can know – a lot of knowledge 
is simply based on assertion or make-belief. As indicated, in early India, any 
tempting focus on monotheism and on the Vedic key concepts themselves was 
constantly questioned by all those polluting ‘others’ that were around at the same 
time (Chattopadhyaya, 2007: 145-6). Vigorously queried, these contested matters 
were ultimately demasked as constructs and had to be left open to individual belief. 
Nobody had ultimate proof that their truth was the only one. If the Buddhists so 
clearly negated Vedic sacrifices (Chattopadhyaya, 2007: 147), they would also 
challenge early Hindu conceptualisations of rita, not just vaguely emerging 
concepts of Hindu dharma. If Olivelle (2006a), to some extent rightly, argues that 
Buddhists rather than Hindus should be credited with developing dharma, I suggest 
that in this pluralist cauldron, a giant wok of comparative jurisprudence, no one 
group could ultimately claim total credit for contributing to or developing any of 
these notions. They are hybrid notions, of hybrid issues, pluralist noodles in that 
early giant wok.4 All elements were influenced and flavoured by the other elements 
around them, and the respective terminologies are only slightly different through 
use of Sanskrit and different types of colloquial languages or Prakrits. Most 
evidently, Sanskrit dharma becomes dhamma in Prakrit, and so on. 
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 Significantly, too, the Buddha did not set himself up as a messenger from God, 
nor as a god himself, simply as a role model or as an authenticable authority, as is 
clearly explained by Olivelle (2006a: 177). Jainism, too, is largely based on role 
models, guides across treacherous ground (tīrthankaras), most prominently 
Mahavira (Jain, 1991: 15). More than a few hundred years down the line, and in a 
slightly different part of the world, a certain other man called Mohammad (c. 570-
632), was equally super-conscious not to slip into the tempting role of Napoleon-
like law-maker and only claimed to be God’s dutiful messenger (Menski, 2006: 
285). Much later still, the Sikhs cultivate their monotheistic messages in various 
plurality-conscious ways, too. Evidently, in the various cultural contexts of Asia 
and Africa self-controlled ordering and karmic connections retain a prominent 
value. No Austinian law-maker’s skeleton rattled in Vedic cupboards. Instead there 
were vigorous and clearly unsettling – and hence also intellectually stimulating and 
fierce – debates and contests over Truth and right belief and, increasingly, over 
right action. 
 In these early manifestations of struggles to identify what is the ‘right law’, we 
see reflections of an era of decay (kaliyuga) – which continues today - already 
during Vedic times. While this is normally treated as the later Hindu technical term 
for the age of confusion, the phenomenon itself is not just a post-classical element 
of Hindu law; this, too, already has Vedic roots. Unsurprisingly, Brahmins as the 
early leading searchers for truth and understanding would claim superior status 
within the emerging caste system and would set themselves up in ‘business’ in 
various ways, especially once the Vedic ritual system began to collapse. As skilled 
cultural and legal navigators, they had the tools needed to redefine and restructure 
the early foundations and to mould them according to their own specific needs.  So 
we find new ritual practices, but also new ventures in agriculture and other lines of 
acquisition of wealth (artha), another key term which must never be read as totally 
delinked from its overarching dharma connection. 
 However, putting the spotlight on Brahmins we seem to gaze at religion and 
also perceive early forms of the Indian caste system. Today, we thus stumble into 
the irritating global thicket of how to handle difference and diversity at various 
levels, quickly losing sight of the internal processes of navigating truth claims 
within early Indic cultures. Since various strands of scholarship encounter serious 
ideological problems with such subjects as religion and caste, and various shutters 
come down in the process, the task of excavation becomes more difficult again in 
the resulting darkness of the mental laboratory. Sanskritists find themselves today 
almost collectively blacklisted, since discussing anything ‘Hindu’ appears 
offensive these days to many secular universalists; indeed, the term itself has 
become a kind of dirty word. Banned from relevant discourses unless they toe 
dominant politically correct lines (see Vasudevacharya, 2008), Sanskritists are 
sidelined specialists that struggle to claim a legitimate voice as interdisciplinary 
cultural experts. Some lawyers and judges write books on Hindu law that contain 
many good points, but are treated with deep suspicion (Jois, 2002). I tried this 
excavation work a few years ago (Menski, 2003), only to be pelted with abuse and 
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to be cold-shouldered by those who wear glasses that filter out anything ‘religious’ 
and ‘traditional’. 
 Reflections of this fierce ideological struggle are also found in law classrooms 
every single day of our working lives. This simmering conflict infects scholarship 
in Sanskrit, too, largely invisibly, like a virus in an immune system. As a result, we 
do not talk in sufficient depth about Vedic religion and law and even refuse to 
discuss the natural law foundations of Hindu law, as Jamison’s action so clearly 
showed. Instead energies are manipulatively channelled into currently fashionable 
topics, like gender and human rights, which actually offers the chance to develop 
really wonderful new interdisciplinary research of the kind that Jamison (2006) 
herself has produced, if only this was connected to current legal research about 
women’s rights (Kotiswaran, 2008). But this does not happen; there are significant 
mental blockages. At the end of the day, regrettably, energetic analysis sans gaz 
remains without fizz, deprived of the intellectual vitamins needed to face the 
strains of global tests of credibility (see Menski, 2010).  
 Amazingly, such current issues of global terror in scholarship, attempting to 
silence others, are a familiar pattern even in Vedic discourses. If we examine our 
texts closely enough, we realise that the ancient search for Truth reflected in them 
is still on today. Wars over words and their meaning thus continue, as though we 
learnt nothing for centuries. Excavation stirs up trouble; it may locate unexploded 
shells. The official view often is, therefore, that such scholarship is not desirable in 
today’s world; its rocks the boat of political correctness. In such dictatorial efforts 
to shut out ‘the other’, inadequate attention is given to producing deep analyses of 
different legal systems of the world, and especially of Asia and Africa, more so if 
we start only at much later periods of development. Of course, if the view is taken 
anyway that the entire world should work towards having one legal system, ancient 
forms of Indic and other truths lose all relevance in comparison to the fashionable 
axioms of Eurocentric human rights discourses. Jamison’s refusal to discuss Hindu 
natural law shows that such scholar-politicians desperately deny any legitimacy to 
arguments that ancient Hindus knew what we know about law. One must wonder 
whether such perceptions are more inspired by doggedly persistent beliefs in 
positivist dogma, the desperate desire to divide law and religion, or Western-led 
efforts (Jamison, too, being American) to dominate the world. Raising such 
questions enters inevitably into contemporary scholarly politics and distracts from 
the task of excavating other early forms of Sanskrit law.  
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Emerging socio-legal dimensions in Vedic law: dharma, mitra and vrata 
 
To return to Vedic law, we note that in the remainder of her encyclopedia entry, 
Jamison (2009: 151) indicates that early legal regulation focused particularly on 
family law. I have no problems with that in principle, especially: 
 
That all these passages concern laws relating to women suggests that the 
gradual codification of customs began with marriage and family law, 
marriage representing the most potent exchange relation found in early 
Vedic society. 
 
My unpublished doctoral thesis (Menski, 1984) has much to say on the socio-
cultural, ritual and legal reconstruction of marriage, from a time well before I 
morphed from a Sanskritist into a comparative lawyer. While the notion of a 
‘gradual codification of customs’ in the above quote seems rather too legalistic, I 
agree with the amazingly strong text-based findings by Olivelle (2006a) that 
appreciating custom is already central to Vedic law, and certainly later in the era of 
dharma. While we certainly do not find state involvement as yet in such 
codification projects, the main risk here is, however, that text-based scholars lead 
us towards seeing the later dharma texts as more or less codified custom. But who 
was behind this codification, and why? I cannot emphasise enough that this 
remains a huge problem for understanding early Hindu law, discussed ad nauseam 
by reference to the skeletons of Manu and other purported ‘lawmakers’ (Menski, 
2003). For, it is certain that early Indic states did not make marriage laws and other 
rules about people’s daily lives –this would have violated the basic principle that 
dharma is context-specific. In fact, even today Indian Hindu marriage law remains 
primarily a matter of customary ritual celebration, not state-centric 
bureaucratisation (Menski, 2001, chapter 1). But we continue to find new books on 
Hindu law with deeply misleading titles, indicating the emergence of early law 
codes (Olivelle, 2000) or even The Laws of Manu (Olivelle, 2006b). Apparently, 
this is happening simply because of the economics of publishing, since publishers 
find that such books sell better than ancient philosophy or analyses of legal 
pluralism. Remarkably, there is now a brand new study on The spirit of Hindu law, 
emphasising intriguingly that ‘law itself can be understood as a theology of daily 
life’ (Davis, 2010: i).  
 Staying in Vedic times just a little longer, we need to switch on the analytical 
searchlight again to re-examine the huge entry on rita in Monier-Williams (1976 
[1899]: 223-4), which testifies to the importance of this early key term and 
provides all kinds of definitions for the noun that typically blur various disciplinary 
boundaries: 
 
fixed or settled order, law, rule (esp. in religion); sacred or pious action or 
custom, divine law, faith, divine truth (these meanings are given by BRD, 
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and are generally more to be accepted than those and native authorities and 
marked L. below)….truth in general, righteousness, right… 
 
Additional explanations like ‘right means of obtaining a livelihood’ (id.) and the 
many combinations of the word with various suffixes leave it entirely open to 
interpretation precisely what kind of ‘law’ the term rita refers to. Monier Williams 
was not a legal theorist, so the term ‘natural law’ is not listed under this entry, nor  
is ‘Nature’, but ‘truth’ and ‘order’ are clearly mentioned. The key issue then 
becomes whether such concepts are to be perceived as religious or secular entities. 
In this context, other terms may well be relevant, or may distract the analyst. 
  
Mitra, vrata and rita: Religious or secular, or both? 
Re-reading May (1985: 18-25) side by side with Jamison (2009), one sees many 
more references that link rita to natural order, but also to the Sanskrit terms vrata 
(‘commandment’, later ‘vow’, see further below) and dharman. Notably, there are 
more pluralities and there is much fluidity. Jamison (2009: 150) states: 
 
Even using concepts that structure later periods of ancient India is 
problematic, for the terminology is entirely different (e.g. Vedic dharman 
“foundation” is not semantically equivalent to the classical term dharma) 
and the institutions that reflect or impose dharma in later India have not 
developed their classical form.  
 
This awareness of plurality is highly relevant for further explorations of other terms 
for ‘law’ in early Sanskrit law. Apparently, only Rigveda 5.63.7 brings all the three 
key terms together (May, 1985: 18) and this text also indicates that Mitra and 
Varuna are the early powerful gods, perceived to rule over the whole world 
according to cosmic order (ritena) and to have established the sun. May (1985: 18) 
sees here ‘an all-embracing idea of action and order to co-ordinate the visible and 
invisible phenomena’. According to May (1985: 21), then, whose analysis relies on 
several earlier studies, the key image or conceptualisation is that out of an 
imagined universal Ur-Chaos, the transformation to an ordered cosmos took place, 
in a manner that humans can forever only speculate about. This interpretation takes 
us back to and matches the analysis by Proferes (2009), discussed above. 
Interestingly, neither analysis seeks to deny the presence of what comparative 
lawyers and jurists call ‘natural law’ and no explicit distinction is made between 
secular and religious spheres. An imperfectly ordered universe is a global reality – 
how to explain where it came from and what might make it ‘tick’ are different 
matters and challenges. 
 We then note that Jamison’s (2009: 150) entry on ‘Vedic law, 1500-800 B.C.E.’ 
states from the start that ‘[t]he preserved texts are entirely religious. Secular 
authority, distinct from the religious social structures evident in the Vedic texts, 
can only be studied indirectly’. Such explicit comments set up the textual 
foundations of Hindu law as exclusively religious, rather than legal, but a few lines 
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later they also recognise the social dimensions involved and leave it open whether 
these are religious or secular. In this model of analysis, then, any form of ‘law’ 
comes after ‘religion’ and is not per se religious, while religion is quite closely and 
somewhat less hesitantly linked with society, presumably to form early Vedic 
culture. It is obvious that in such a frame of reference, the concept of natural law, 
to the extent that it suggests some religious input, irritates and confuses the text-
focused non-lawyer indologist who seems to reserve the category of ‘natural law’ 
only for early European legal systems and more specifically for pre-Christian law 
as found in Greece, but refuses to recognise its presence for early non-Western 
legal systems. This kind of Eurocentric myopia poses huge problems also in 
scholarship on Chinese law, African laws, and to some extent, but differently, for 
Islamic law (see Menski, 2006). 
 Jamison’s entry proceeds to clearly identify ‘exchange’ and various other forms 
of human relationships, prominently hospitality, as a social requirement. Are such 
exchanges ‘social’, ‘economic’, ‘cultural’, or an amalgam of various aspects? A 
comparative lawyer sees that the perspective taken here without further comment is 
typical of historical or socio-legal approaches: humans developed various 
relationships. Given that indologists have to be interdisciplinary navigators, is this 
possibly also a form of normative construction and thus of ‘law’? Are there links 
between such social norms and/or laws and religion? Significantly, while I 
concentrated in my analysis (Menski, 2003: 86-93) on rita, Jamison’s (2009: 150) 
entry focuses next on the concepts of mitra and vrata:  
 
The requirement of hospitality bound all members of society, but there were 
other more specific relationships: an “alliance” (mitra) could be mutually 
contracted, entailing reciprocal responsibilities between equals; by contrast, 
a “commandment” or “ordinance” (vrata, later “vow”) was imposed by a 
superior on an inferior. The domain of the term vrata is the closest to be 
found in Vedic terminology to the conceptual sphere of “law”. The verb 
regularly governing vrata belongs to the root dhri, “uphold, support”, and it 
is surely no accident that a nominal derivative, dhārma, takes over much of 
the semantic space of vrata in later Sanskrit. Gods in a kingly function and 
earthly kings themselves are charged with the upholding of vratas, later of 
dharma, and over the Vedic period the consolidation of legal power around 
kings can be discerned. 
 
This becomes highly relevant for the present discussion of different categories of 
early Sanskrit law. Jamison identifies early contract law (mitra being the relevant 
concept) as a secular entity, an early form of ‘private law’. However, this also 
seems myopic. In light of references to a solemn contract in the epic Rāmāyana 
between Rama and Sugriva, which is a pact between two fighters, one sees that this 
contract was solemnised by both men walking round the fire (agni) as a holy 
witness. This is certainly not an early civil partnership, as we would call it now, but 
an alliance in warfare. Whether Rama and Sugriva were equals, a peripheral issue 
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at this point, may actually be doubted. What fascinates is that this solemn ritual of 
two men walking round a fire later seems to become a key ritual element of Hindu 
wedding ceremonies. One still sees this today when a Hindu husband and wife go 
around the holy fire a number of times. This ritual of agniparināyana, confused 
and conflated with the saptapadī ritual not only in old India, but also in section 
7(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 in India today, which imagines the couple 
going round the fire a number of times,5
 Jamison (2009) as cited above distinguishes this type of law from various forms 
of vrata as command. This Austinian element seems to be a secular entity as well, 
and eventually turns into what we would today call ‘public law’. So there is some 
evidence, according to this explanatory model, of early forms of both private and 
public law. But where exactly the various boundaries (private/public and 
religious/secular) are to be drawn within this plural legal field is not made clear in 
this analysis. 
 still raises huge unanswered questions 
about whether husband and wife are seen as equals and thus are engaged in a 
contractual mitra type of law or a kind of vrata.  
 Positing that the basic condition of interlinkedness militates against drawing of 
clear-cut boundaries anyway, I find this really exciting, since it is now no longer 
just a matter of discussing whether natural law existed or not in early Vedic law. 
We are locating here the origins of various forms of Vedic positive law and are 
drawing boundaries. Jamison tells us, in effect, that vrata rather than rita should be 
seen as the key concept of later Hindu law, manifesting eventually in the shape of 
dharma. This finding is also exciting because taking vrata as ‘contract’ or 
‘promise’ means that the foundations of Hindu law are based on an understanding 
that humans have to honour obligations, not necessarily a matter of religion, but a 
form of positive law, most likely then of secular law.  
 But can such manifestations of law really be seen as entirely divorced and 
separated from ‘religion’? A scholar may not wish to talk about religion, but are we 
re-constructing something secular here out of basically religious elements? As we 
saw, the texts in which such early concepts appear were accepted by Jamison 
herself as ‘religious’ texts and wisely (as we shall see, for more than one reason) 
she does not claim that they are also ‘legal’. The links between ordering human 
relationships and honouring contracts between humans, whether we think 
immediately of king-like figures and thus the state or not, cannot, however, be 
treated as totally separate from links between humans and Nature. The Vedic 
rituals were not, as far as I know, performed to make humans obey obligations to 
each other, but primarily linked Man and Nature.  
 Looking again carefully at Jamison’s quote above allows us to realise that she 
primarily makes a distinction between explicitly social relationships (centred on 
mitra) and emerging state law (centred on vrata). This means she avoids - or 
maybe sees no need for – a discussion of whether this is a religious or a secular 
law.6 The debate seems to be focused, then, only on different types of secular law 
within a religious textual context. In Indian caste-based societies, which have 
indeed Vedic foundations that Jamison herself refers to, reciprocal relationships 
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would primarily arise between unequals, but still at a social level. So mitra cannot 
be simply or exclusively seen as ‘private’ law or ‘social’, and vrata exclusively as 
‘public’ law or ‘legal’, because the only distinction highlighted by Jamison is 
whether the respective parties are equals or unequals. Both of these categories of 
human relations, in my interpretation, are primarily social and/or political concepts, 
whether between equals or unequals. To refuse to accept this reasoning would 
imply that a contract between equals cannot be a form of law, and is only a social 
norm, clearly not a feasible argument. 
 In Jamison’s scheme, then, making contracts and establishing personal 
relationships, whether equal or unequal ones, is not actually primarily seen as a 
matter of law, but as the creation of social relations and socio-political normativity. 
Law for Jamison, therefore, is restricted only to what legal scholars call ‘positive 
law’, involving the imposition of rules by someone who is in some kind of power 
relationship to command or, if inferior, to exert force over the superior, through a 
vrata, claiming an obligation, maybe even a right. This is also the position taken by 
Lingat (1973: 6) when he had problems with ‘individual conscience’ as a source of 
law (see Menski, 2003: 126). 
 So here we have the evidence I was looking for: According to the quote from 
Jamison (2009: 150) as already cited above, ‘[g]ods in a kingly function and 
earthly kings themselves are charged with the upholding of vratas, later of 
dharma…’ is portrayed as the starting point of Vedic law which can properly be 
called ‘law’. This law is secular and has primarily nothing to do with religion. It is 
no surprise, then, that Jamison had no time for any form of natural law.  
 This explanatory model, however, simply attempts to shut out religion, 
presenting in my view an incomplete and rushed analysis of ancient Sanskrit law. 
This restricted methodology fails to identify that at the same time as these secular 
concepts are developing, other linkages have to be added to the equation. As 
indicated, when two men walk round a holy fire to close a contract, when a couple 
does the same for marriage, or a ruler engages in various forms of rituals, Nature 
and thus natural law also slips in and religion cannot be entirely sidelined. We have 
proof of this in the marriage hymns of the Rigveda itself. Vedic Sanskrit law does 
not ring fence law from religion, they are treated as closely interlinked and in fact 
as supplementary. 
 Further, I noted that Chattopadhyaya (2007: 146-7), who analyses the intense 
competition between different groups in Vedic society, points out that a string of 
negative terms in Rigvedic texts refer to the dasyus and dasas. These are not as 
curious as the author seemed to think: 
 
They are akarma, apparently referring to the set of proper rites which they 
did not perform; they are also anyavrata, devoid of the right kind of ritual, 
performing another kind instead. They are amanta, that is, they do not pay 
heed to what obviously requires careful attention, and are therefore not 
human beings, or are amanusa. 
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This dehumanising ‘othering’ is quite comprehensive and reflects an intricate 
mixture of ethical/religious and socio-legal concerns. I do not think that we have so 
far analysed such linkages and messy mixtures in sufficient depth. I note with 
particular interest that anyavrata is here linked explicitly to ritual action, not the 
refusal to obey orders, or to honour contractual obligations. So these allegedly 
lowly people are not just socially and economically unreliable, they also fail to 
follow correct ritual models. If we follow Jamison’s secular understanding of 
vrata, then the above refusal ‘to do the right thing’ in ritual terms is an unwarranted 
interpretation. Is one of these interpretations of the Sanskrit terminology wrong, 
therefore? 
 Given the scope for different interpretations of the old Sanskrit terms, here 
explicitly vrata, the next analytical challenge would then be to re-examine the links 
and crossovers between secular and religious normative constructs within Vedic 
law. I suggest a priori that legal pluralist methodology helps to throw added light 
on this complex subject. 
 
Vedic ritual connectivity as a manifestation of legal pluralism 
The key question is thus probably how an early Vedic ruler would have viewed the 
emergence of Vedic law and his own role in it. Surely, such a ruler was not an 
Austinian law maker or some kind of Napoleon? Jamison’s focus on vrata simply 
posited that the business of ruling and issuing commands eventually led to legal 
structures. It seems to make nice sense, especially in view of perceptions that law is 
about ruling and governance. How tempting, and yet how myopic, especially in 
light of what Chattopadhyaya (2007: 146-7) suggested about the violation of vrata. 
I have no problem with the argument that a Vedic ruler might simply use vrata to 
command something and demand the delivery of obligations. He might indeed be 
corrupt, power hungry, aggressive, dictatorial, but was this tolerable? As indicated 
so far, if a ruler were to issue commands in relation to equals, then this would be a 
mitra – type of legal relation rather than a vrata – type. I see no problem in 
principle, bar the difficulty to determine what is or is not equal or unequal.  
 More tricky, however, is the question whether a superior person or institution 
would also monitor contracts of the mitra or vrata  type, and would thus establish 
some early kind of Hindu ‘rule of law’. The scenario itself is entirely possible, so 
that the Vedic ruler has an emerging extra function, specifically securing the 
sanctity of contracts, and maybe then even punishing or threatening to punish 
wrongdoers, those who failed to honour various types of contractual obligations, 
whether social, economic or political. That kind of control function, from our 
current Western perspective, would be, primarily, a secular function, and one that 
becomes probably increasingly important in later discussions within Hindu law of 
rājadharma. But is that already a Vedic concept, or does it properly belong into the 
formative period, even late classical Hindu law, where we certainly find danda, the 
concept of deterrent punishment to assist the maintenance of dharma? 
 I suggest at this point that something extremely critical to the Vedic framework 
of reference has still been left out here, whether deliberately or by coincidence. 
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What do we know, and what do we need to understand about the obligations of the 
Vedic ruler, whether a king-like figure or head of household (the Roman pater 
familias) to ensure that the cosmic Order of Nature was upheld and strengthened? 
What about the function of rulers – and their wives - as Jamison herself so 
brilliantly showed in Edinburgh during the previous Sanskrit Conference in 2006, 
as upholders of cosmic Order in the first place? Here again, we see that Vedic Man 
could not escape from concepts of Nature and thus of natural law. Why, then, is 
this gap here in the indological analysis? Is it a strategic silence, deliberate 
omission, or a simple oversight? The latter would be surprising, given the 
prominence of early Vedic sacrificial rituals. 
 The question becomes then whether we can find a specific term for this kind of 
obligation as well, and if so, what is it? The Vedic sacrifices would have to be done 
in a proper manner, ritena, in accordance with Order, to be effective. If I focus 
again on rita here, where then does this leave Jamison’s vrata? Is vrata really just a 
secular category that eventually turns into dharma? Or are both vrata and dharma 
also religious concepts and entities? Or are both vrata and dharma actually 
subsumed in rita, embryonically located there, and then gradually developing their 
own specific meanings? 
 The question is therefore also what makes humans engage in these Vedic 
sacrifices. What kind of obligation is this, a religious or a secular one, or both, and 
what term or terms do we find used in relation to such rituals? Specifically, is there 
a Sanskrit word for the obligation to conduct or at least to finance the Vedic rituals, 
as the sacrificial sponsor (yajmān) and his wife (patnī) would be expected to do? 
And if there is, what kind of legal phenomenon, what kind of ‘law’ is that? Can we 
bring it under vrata? Or is that also an aspect of rita? In that case, the Sanskrit term 
rita may also include the obligation to partake in the Vedic rituals, or at least to 
contribute through some other means to their performance. 
 If we dig again for the definitions of rita cited from Monier Williams (1976 
[1899]: 223-4) above, the element for further examination here would be ‘sacred or 
pious action or custom’, namely the Vedic customary action to conduct rituals to 
connect humans and the cosmos. If this assumption is correct, then rita does indeed 
include a somewhat religious obligation on the part of specific resourceful persons 
in Vedic society to ensure that cosmic harmony and balance does not turn into 
chaos. Then rita is also the earliest aspect of rājadharma, and it would in my 
scheme of internally plural legal pluralism count as an obligation to the cosmos, 
and would thus be primarily religious rather than secular. The main point is, 
though, that it is both at the same time. 
 To be absolutely sure, I cross-checked the entry under ‘natural law theory’ in a 
prominent recent legal reference work (Cane and Conaghan, 2008: 821-3). We read 
here, succinctly written by Professor Roger Brownsword (2008: 821-2) that there 
are many theories of natural law, but that they have one particular thing in 
common: 
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Broadly speaking, theories within the natural law tradition emphasize an 
essential conceptual connection between law and morals. In response to the 
core jurisprudential question, ‘What is law?’, such theories elaborate a 
conceptual view that necessarily links (and subsumes) legal reason to moral 
reason, legal obligation to moral obligation, legal validity to moral validity, 
and so on. In some versions, the link is procedural, moral notions of fair 
dealing shaping legal doctrines of due process; in others, the link is 
substantive, moral principles setting the standard for the content of legal 
rules. In some versions, the grounding is secular; in others, it is religious 
(most famously perhaps in the schematic thought of Thomas Aquinas). 
However, the common denominator in all versions of natural law theory is 
that the ‘separation thesis’ of legal positivism – the thesis that, while the 
existence of law is one thing, its moral merit or demerit is quite another 
matter – is contested. Or, to put this another way, if we follow natural law 
theory, we will reject the idea that law is an entirely autonomous, discrete 
body of rules and principles; law might not be identical to morality, but 
there is a sense in which they are necessarily related and integrated. 
 
Now, why then are indologists afraid of natural law? Jamison (2009: 150), as cited 
earlier above, conceded ‘religious social structures’, but wishes to keep ‘law’ and 
‘religion’ as entirely separate. Again, it is clear that in such a deliberately myopic 
scholarly worldview of the interaction of law, society, religion and culture, no 
room is allowed for natural law as a religious entity. But the evidence we are 
dealing with here is not from secular post-British America, but from Rigvedic early 
India. Should that not make a difference? What is going on here? 
 
 
The fear of religion among Indologists 
 
Again entering the troubled territory of ideology, let us not forget what we are 
trying to achieve here as scholars of Sanskrit law. Being in stage 3 of the 
indological quest for knowledge, in Panikkar’s terms (1985), one is trying to 
understand the earliest roots of Hindu law, examining Sanskrit concepts of 
relevance to this discussion. It is in my view undeniable that these earliest roots are 
clearly, as in other legal systems, lying in a pluralistic basis, which includes 
manifestations of religious-cum-secular natural law. The Vedas, as stated, did not 
drop from Heaven in some Golden Era of Indic history, they developed organically 
into texts, over a long time. Perceived and portrayed as śruti because nobody could 
credibly claim to universal satisfaction in this hotpot of religious discussions and 
competing philosophies that a particular God or god had made this kind of ‘law’, 
these textual foundations later turned into smriti and could then be taken, by some, 
as manifested predominantly as positive law. That this option is possible does not 
mean that it is the only possible explanation for what ancient Hindu law is and how 
it developed from Vedic roots to later manifestations. Legal development occurs in 
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all legal systems. Short of denying the religious roots of the Vedic system, we thus 
cannot avoid to find that Vedic Sanskrit law is a form of natural law, linked to 
people’s view of the world, morality, ethics, and a lot of psychology. 
 If that is correct, however, then it does not make sense to deny the presence of 
Vedic natural law – this is mere ideological positioning. It also does not make 
sense then for indologists to speak of the later ‘classical’ or formative period, as 
Olivelle (2009) does, as the truly formative period of Hindu law. In that case the 
label ‘formative period’ ought to be allocated already to the Vedic period, since it 
was firmly established during that period that humans have obligations not only to 
each other or to their own salvation agenda, but also to Nature, or a higher Order, 
however perceived, which they can only fulfil through correct ritual action, namely 
the elaborate Vedic sacrifices. That this was vigorously challenged by Buddhists 
and others is a different matter. We are trying to search for Hindu roots in a soil in 
which all these various roots are intertwined and clearly cross-fertilised. Vedic 
sacrifice, then, falls under rita rather than vrata, and both concepts in various 
amalgams seem to have contributed to the later prominence of the consolidated and 
typically multi-facetted key concept of dharma. Saying this does not exclude the 
very plausible analysis by Olivelle (2006a) to the effect that dharma was 
prominently influenced by Buddhist concepts and later had to be recycled by 
Hindus to retain its central role. While in any human society, a sense of obligation 
to do the right thing would be central, what is contested everywhere is simply what 
is the right thing to do, not the principle itself. 
 So why are scholars of Vedic Sanskrit afraid of comprehensively examining the 
links between religion and law? It seems clear, as I know well from personal 
experience (notably my predecessor, Professor J.D.M. Derrett recounted similar 
attacks), that indological specialists studying aspects of Hindu law run the 
professional risk of being treated as proponents of hindutva in its more militant, 
Hindu nationalist manifestations. So Sanskrit law specialists are collectively 
shunned as potential fundamentalists and may become worried about being 
polluted by religion and its superiority claims. The problem is, however, that 
scholars of Sanskrit cannot avoid finding, all over the place and in various periods 
of Hindu legal history, that law is linked in various ways to a culture-specific 
religion that evolves over time. Our basic texts, certainly the Vedas, are clearly of a 
religious nature. To that extent, Jamison is clearly right. 
 So the problem is really only in our own minds as scholars operating in today’s 
world. We seem to think we have reason to be afraid of being seen as dominated 
and dictated to by religion. We are afraid to identify and accept legal rules in Hindu 
law as linked to what St. Thomas Aquinas identified as Nature because we worry 
that we will be seen as ‘fundamentalists’. Speaking from his particular medieval 
Christian perspective, Aquinas of course took the view that God’s law was 
supreme, that Nature was of God’s making and that consequently God’s law must 
be supreme. But even St. Thomas Aquinas left room for lex humana and thus laid 
conceptual foundations for the eventual emergence of full-scale recognition of 
various culture-specific forms of positive law, which could then also later be seen 
WERNER MENSKI           30 
 
as secular laws. In comparison, Indologists have simply not deeply enough 
internalised the basic foundations of the internal plurality of Hinduism and of 
Hindu law. If we refuse to consider the role of religion in relation to law and insists 
on seeing Hindu law as a separate, secular entity, as free as possible from religious 
pollution and particularly rabid and aggressive hindutva ideology, we are not 
giving a true reflection of what this ancient law was like. It appears now that the 
most recent study by Davis (2010) addresses just that issue without fear of 
scholarly censorship. 
 I show below not only that the methodologies of legal pluralism can rescue us 
from such globally feared pollutions of law by religion, but that unless we 
constructively examine and employ the linkages that Sanskrit law knew to exist 
between these supposedly separate categories, we will not understand the complex 
nature of Hindu law (and thus also of Indian laws today) as living manifestations of 
legal pluralism that have existed, with numerous variations and 
transmogrifications, since Vedic times. 
 The only ideological trouble that prevents leading scholars of Sanskrit from 
agreeing with this approach is the fear, then, that accepting the evidence that Hindu 
law has strong Vedic roots leads to support for arguments that these strong 
religious roots should then dictate to us, at any point of our lives – or rather to 
hundreds of millions of Hindus in existence today - how to conduct their daily 
lives. One finds clearly stated evidence of this kind of fear in Olivelle (2009: 152), 
which suggests that these linkages are a kind of convenient religious fiction: 
 
The claim that the Veda is the source of all dharma is clearly a theological 
fiction created to endow later texts with the transcendence, authority and 
sacrality of the Vedic scriptures. 
 
This is clearly a reflection of the evident dangers of religious politics, but does not 
pay sufficient attention to the remedies offered by plurality-conscious comparative 
legal scholarship. So do we need to embark on a fourth stage of indological 
scholarship here, connecting the findings of classical Indology to global legal 




The remedy: Plurality-conscious scholarship 
 
If one applies the pluralist methodology that I am developing and recognises that 
law is always at the same time natural law, socio-cultural norms, positive state-
made law and now also international law, and not one or the other, then all 
ideological phobias about ‘religion’ ought to vanish instantly, or at least the fears 
they generate ought to die down considerably. I was inspired by a Japanese scholar, 
Professor Masaji Chiba (1986) to argue in this way, and fittingly this particular 
paper was originally given in Chiba’s home country. None of the four types of law 
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that I now identify, in the extended model based on Chiba’s (1986) tripartite 
structure,7
 To put one’s head in the sand and fear ‘religion’ is thus not a wise strategy, 
especially not for Sanskritists, since clearly not all aspects of Hindu law are 
explicitly religious. If much of Hindu law is actually secular in nature, what then is 
our worry? Why be afraid of Hindu law and its Vedic roots, which are also not 
entirely religious? For rita is not alone in the semantic field of cosmic and other 
Orders and orders, we find it paired with satya (see below). Even if we find it 
difficult to accept that ancient Vedic law was a natural law system, because we are 
still afraid that in Indic discourses ‘religion’ may claim to trump ‘law’, we need to 
see that within the internally pluralistic Vedic framework, religion in the form of 
the ‘invisible’ is complicatedly mixed with ‘visible’ elements. Most importantly of 
all, and this is an extremely significant difference to mainstream Islamic concepts, 
according to which God somehow needs no human help in running this universe, 
Vedic humans assumed that their ritual actions could help to ‘make the world go 
round’. The assumed connectivity of Vedic rituals via karma concepts (Tull, 1989), 
whether Buddhist or Hindu, and the inherent links between Vedic concepts of Man 
and Nature, created not only a highly pluralist field of reference, they also 
systematically prevented the totalising emergence of religious determinism and 
fundamentalism.  
 can claim to be permanently dominant. If all of them co-exist in the 
basically semi-autonomous internally plural field we are calling ‘law’, there is 
simply a systemic need for constant navigation and balancing of such pluralities of 
laws, as much so today as earlier in history. This basic truth seems to have been 
familiar to ancient Vedic Indians. Of courses abuses will happen and have 
happened in all legal systems, but this is an inevitable outcome of the composite 
nature of law itself. Whole legal systems will crash, like kites in a storm. 
Individuals will kill themselves if they cannot handle the tensions that this constant 
balancing exercise seems to demand of all of us at all times. This is as true today as 
it was in Vedic times. 
 To reiterate, then, among early Indic people, nobody could identify to the 
satisfaction of all persons who or what was behind this cosmic Order. That issue 
remained a matter of belief and personal choice or preference. Hence early Hindus 
learnt to become skilled managers of internal pluralities, a characteristic that has 
stayed with Hinduism as an entity. Early Hindus agreed to disagree a long time ago 
and respected what has often been called ‘unity in diversity’. They became 
plurality-conscious. Buddhists, Jainas and others became ‘dissenters’ in this largely 
Hindu-dominated environment. Muslims, as comparative analysis shows, agreed 
later on one specific God as global motor and all-authoritative guide, but then 
agreed to disagree among themselves over the extent to which human interpretation 
could ascertain God’s will. Muslims, too, if they are good Muslims, thus have to be 
of necessity legal pluralists (Menski, 2006: 281). But most Hindus (and of course 
many other people) simply do not know this, and hence fear the supposedly well-
organised Muslim ‘other’. 
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 In today’s fear-ridden chaotic world, we cannot afford to ignore such basic 
elements of evidence of deep legal pluralism in the various legal traditions of Asia 
and Africa, in the distant past as much as today. If we get too involved in 
remembering our own legal histories as a series of violent struggles over the right 
to make laws, and to make people believe in certain Gods, obviously we will be 
stifled by a lot of fear. Vedic Sanskrit liberates us from such not entirely irrational 
fears and teaches us that the beauty of pluralist compromise was not only invented 
in post-modern minds during the past few decades, it actually has ancient roots. 
With that in mind, we can now turn to a further analysis of the fuzzy boundary 
between ‘law’ and ‘religion’ in Vedic legal developments to put a further nail in 
the coffin of fears about Hindu domination by ‘religion’. 
  
 
Rita and satya: Does the distinction help? 
 
To exemplify this internal plurality and the need to find symbiotic management 
tools, it helps enormously if we re-examine the basic distinction made in Sanskrit 
between rita and satya. In this way, we might get a little further in reducing fears 
of Hindu fundamentalism and promoting increased recognition of the ameliorative 
potential of Hindu traditions for current Indian legal developments. If both 
concepts, rita and satya are aspects of ‘truth’, but rita is more of a religious 
concept, with many secular implications and linkages, the reverse may need to be 
said about satya. It is a secular concept, visible truth’, but that truth is not entirely 
devoid of invisible links to the universe. It is an interlinked part of the universe, 
connected in ways that humans may or may not be able to explain, it will depend 
on the scenario. The duality of these two terms illustrates the conceptual 
foundations of deep legal pluralism in Vedic times. As the moon’s journey across 
our night skies indicates, the boundaries between the visible and the invisible 
change with time and space and thus are fuzzy, too. And whether the sun as a 
globally visible phenomenon can be fully explained in all its various aspects 
remains a riddle that a non-scientist ought not to attempt – grave questions of a 
philosophical nature will remain open even if we can explain some or most aspects 
of this phenomenon of Nature. 
 In Monier Williams (1976 [1899]: 1135) one finds so many notions for satya 
that, like for rita, it becomes impossible to be definite beyond finding ‘truth’ or 
maybe an inkling of emphasis on ‘reality’. Much will depend on the context within 
which that specific term appears in any particular text. It seems to me that satya is 
first of all a form of ‘truth’ that is visible and humanly ascertainable, while rita 
seems to be a form of truth (maybe then better or conveniently put as ‘Truth’ 
without the claim that it is necessarily higher, it is just different within this 
pluralistic context!) that is not humanly explicable, or at least not easily 
explainable. Again, there will be fuzzy boundaries between the two. What to one 
person seems clear and obvious may be a totally inexplicable myth to another. Let 
us not forget that the cleverest scientists in this world have become somewhat 
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‘religious’, if they lived long enough, in the sense that they realised that all their 
life-long efforts to explain everything would never be completely successful. The 
ancient Vedic Indians, intuitively, seem to have known this. Many of them 
concentrated on real life, it seems, not even trying to explain for themselves and/or 
others what was ultimately invisible and inexplicable. And then of course there 
were those huge solemn Vedic rituals as an explicit form of ritual and dramatic 
recognition of the interlinkages between Man and Nature, as a device to protect 
oneself against lurking dangers, as an appeasement or support mechanism for the 
cosmos as a whole, or simply as ritualised bribery.  
 What we cannot deny, as Sanskritists or as comparative scholars, is that rita and 
satya co-exist within this pluralistic verbal and conceptual stew-in-the-wok called 
Veda, and that these two terms will therefore mean different things. The two terms 
rita and satya are used side by side in the very beginning of the Vedic marriage 
hymns in Rigveda 10.85 and I shall focus my analysis here only on this slice of 
text. This particular text appears at a strategically important moment, in a ritually 
extremely significant and potent place, at the beginning of the Vedic marriage 
hymns. Not only does it bring sun and moon together and seems to draw linkages 
between this macocosmic pairing of sun/moon and day/night, it also prefaces the 
microcosmic human pairing of husband and wife and thus nicely does what 
Jamison (2009) suggested so clearly, illustrating the emergence of social norms, 
linked to religious texts and concepts, within Vedic society. The relevant text goes 
as follows: 
 
satyena uttabhitā bhūmih sūryena uttabhitā dyauh 
ritena ādityas tishthanti divi somo adhi śritah 
 
How do we bring out the distinction between these two terms? Volume II of 
Griffith (1971: 501) translates as follows: 
 
TRUTH is the base that bears the earth; by Sūrya are the heavens sustained.8
By Law the Ādityas stand secure, and Soma holds his place in heaven. 
  
 
Geldner (1951: 267-8) translated earlier into German: 
 
Durch die Wahrheit wird die Erde emporgehalten, durch die Sonne wird der 
Himmel emporgehalten. Durch das Gesetz haben die Āditya’s Bestand, und 
ist der Soma in den Himmel versetzt. 
 
I suggest that these two terms are not quite as distinct as Geldner’s and Griffith’s 
opposition of ‘truth’ and ‘law’ seem to suggest, but that they are two sides of the 
same coin of macrocosmic Order. One is primarily ‘secular’ and visible truth 
(satya), namely the earth around us and the sun (and the moon), all of which are 
clearly observable realities. The other pair also exists, but is somewhat less visible, 
i.e. partly invisible (as is indeed much of the moon, even when it is there), and 
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hence more a matter of ‘religious’ truth (rita). The Ādityas as gods clearly fit that 
pattern of invisibility, but the reference to Soma is somewhat ambiguous – and that 
is quite deliberate. It relates not just to the moon, and appears to be a kind of 
sophisticated word play. That Soma is actually the substance used in solemn Vedic 
rituals rather than the moon in the sky is obvious from RV 10.85.5, which also uses 
māsa (with another word play of moon/month), linked to soma, and explicitly 
noted by Geldner (1951: 267-8). Since Soma just as the moon would be more like 
the sun, Soma as the magically potent ritual tool that helps to connect heaven and 
earth is more like a deity and less of a secular natural phenomenon like earth and 
sun.  
 We can now see that particularly the German translation of ‘Gesetz’ (‘positive 
law’) seems so far off an invisible law of nature and even suggests something 
tangible, like legislation or an Austinian ‘command of the sovereign’. Not so 
confusingly, then, in the above translations, observable truth or visible Order, as I 
would call satya, is the more secular element, while known truths that are not so 
easily understood and observed are linked to rita as invisible Order. The obligation 
and expectation to conduct ritual sacrifice must then be more a matter of rita than 
of satya. The purpose of the rituals is not only to connect microcosmic and 
macrocosmic dimensions and arenas, but to bring about ritually promoted 
fulfilment of the abundant marital expectations that these particular Vedic hymns 
illustrate, good health, long life, a football team of sons, and so on.  
 At the start of the Vedic marriage hymn, thus, we can see how the effort to link 
macrocosmic entities with microcosmic realities points us invisibly towards 
presumably later concepts of Hindu marriage as a sacrament, a solemn contract 
between a man and a woman in front of the entire universe, later and even today in 
most cases customarily represented by the holy fire, Agni, which might in certain 
situations just be a candle or an oil lamp waved in front of a couple. This ritualised 
contract is leading towards the establishment of key areas of Hindu family law, 
again a form of private law. Jamison’s understanding of mitra as a relationship of 
equals can actually still be seen as reflected in the later saptapadī rituals of Hindu 
marriage that treat the spouses as friends for life, and maybe even beyond this life 
(Menski, 1991). 
 Jamison also showed in the Edinburgh conference how the Vedic sacrificer 
needed a wife (patnī) to be able to fulfil his ritual obligations. From this follow 
further gendered expectations about matrimony and ritual activities by the spouses 
on a daily basis, which are no longer explicitly part of the Vedic context, but flow 
into ’classical’ Hindu law’s heavily idealised expectations concerning different 
types of dharma, including of course the perfect wife’s strīdharma that our 
deceased colleague Julia Leslie (1989) wrote about so well.  
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Conclusion on Vedic Sanskrit laws 
 
To summarise, then, Vedic Sanskrit as a stew-in-the-wok (and vegetarians can of 
course create a vegetarian version of this, though that does not reflect Vedic 
realities) clearly uses various terms for ‘law’ that can be placed on the kite model 
of global law (Menski, 2009) in different places. Some of those concepts are closer 
to the natural law corner, while most concepts are grouped in the angle of social 
normativity. No concept is just ‘state law’, but if we accept Jamison’s explorations, 
then vrata comes closest to the corner of the state. No concept as yet focuses 
specifically on what today we call ‘international law’, but the strong and ritually 
elaborated awareness of cosmic interlinkedness suggests the conceptual presence 
of global dimensions, so that rita (or maybe rita/satya together) must also be 
deemed to incorporate this element and should then be the conceptual pair that 
occupies the central spot in this kite structure. 
 
 
Nothing new thereafter? ‘Classical’ Hindu law 
or ‘the formative period’?  
 
The element of expecting self-controlled order as a central theme of Hindu law 
(Menski, 2003: xix) remains in place in the gradual transition from rita to dharma, 
which signifies the shift of emphasis from Vedic macrocosmic focus towards the 
more microcosmic orientation of dharma. What we do not know in detail, and will 
probably never be able to ascertain or excavate, is how in socio-legal reality these 
various shifts took place.  
 While the semantic field itself and its internal dynamism appear to be well-
researched, there seem to be several possible interpretations of how this happened 
on the ground. I have emphasised the Vedic roots of later Hindu legal 
developments and have sought to bring out the conceptual linkages between 
Hindu-centric rita and dharma (Menski, 2003: 96-99), citing Kane and Lingat, in 
particular, to illustrate the gradual shift from Vedic natural law to ‘classical’ Hindu 
socio-legal theory. So, Menski (2003: 96-7) suggests: 
 
The early, but properly ‘classical’ development of Hindu law can be 
distinguished from the Vedic stage primarily by placing more emphasis on 
the individual actions of every Hindu, and by developing a more elaborate 
rule system which reinforces the processes of individualization and 
Hinduization. In terms of sacrifice, this means that every Hindu should now 
engage in the various sacrificial rituals as part of dharma, but also that ritual 
action alone would not suffice to achieve positive cosmic reactions. 
Eventually, right action and appropriate behaviour at every point of one’s 
life became the core expectation of Hindu law, encapsulated in dharma. 
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 Thus, over time Hinduism has evolved and adapted. It has quite radically 
changed its gods, its form of sacrifice, but not its conceptual basis in terms 
of Order/order, which has merely internalised the shift from macrocosmic to 
microcosmic emphasis. The basic concept of mutuality between the visible 
and the invisible, between human sphere and universe, remains at the core. 
During the classical period, these linkages become further elaborated and 
illustrated with innumerable references to situations of daily life. The 
general shift from an earlier emphasis on ritual action to the expectation of 
righteous action at any point of one’s life is clearly manifest. 
 
I see no reason to take any of this back in the light of the current analysis. 
However, it appears that this kind of effort is perceived as dangerous in terms of 
supporting hindutva agenda. I discussed already that Olivelle (2009: 152) suggests 
that these linkages are a kind of convenient religious fiction. To cite this again: 
 
The claim that the Veda is the source of all dharma is clearly a theological 
fiction created to endow later texts with the transcendence, authority and 
sacrality of the Vedic scriptures. 
 
However, such exaggerated hindutva claims can only be made in the first place if 
one assumes that the Vedic texts themselves were some kind of positive ‘law’. I 
think that particular claim or assumption is simply not supportable on the basis of 
the texts that we have. What we do have, however, is ample evidence of conceptual 
linkages and ethical expectations, with constantly refigured additions to the older 
Vedic tradition. In other words, the legal pluralist scenario of the Vedic period 
continued to develop dynamically and in specific ways that we need to research 
further. 
 In the OIELH, Olivelle (2009: 151-5) suggests in this regard a formative period 
of Hindu law between 400 B.C.E. – 400 C.E., which of course now oddly leaves 
400 years of gap between the entry on Vedic law and that on the formative period 
in volume 3 of the OIELH, which the entire editorial team did not seem to notice. 
In that black hole of 400 years, the development of early Hindu law certainly did 
not stand still, however. Olivelle (2009: 151) explicitly raises the question of how 
the genre of dharmasūtra and dharmaśāstra literature arose and suggests: 
 
Dharma is still a marginal concept in the theology expressed in the Vedic 
literature; it is used principally within the royal or secular rather than the 
strictly ritual or religious vocabulary. It probably rose to prominence in the 
religious discourse of India between the fourth and fifth centuries B.C.E. 
because of its adoption, along with other terms and symbols of royalty, by 
the newly emergent ascetic religions, especially Buddhism, and its use in an 
imperial theology articulated by Emperor Aśoka in the middle of the third 
century B.C.E. Given the marginality of dharma in the Vedic vocabulary, it 
is unlikely that the term would have been the subject of intense scholarly or 
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exegetical enquiry by Brahmanical theologians, the priestly guardians of the 
Vedic scriptures, during the late Vedic period (seventh to fourth centuries 
B.C.E.). 
 
I can live with that, and do not have the energy and skills to contradict the assertion 
by Olivelle (2009: 151) that the Brahmins were virtually forced by developments in 
other religious and legal traditions developing around them to reconfigure their 
central concepts of ‘law’. It must be noted, though, that the OIELH entries exactly 
do not cover the late Vedic period. We will need to undertake further text-based 
and conceptual research specifically on that crucial period to excavate, if possible, 
if any further linkages and developments can be shown. It is already quite clear that 
the key argument promoted by Olivelle (2009: 151-2) makes good sense in various 
ways: 
 
Once dharma had become a central concept in the religious discourse of 
Buddhism and penetrated the general vocabulary of ethics, especially 
through its adoption by Aśoka and possibly also his predecessors in 
developing an imperial theology, Brahmanical theologians had little option 
but to define their own religion, ethics, and way of life in terms of dharma. 
Indeed, the scrutiny of the early meaning of dharma in its dharmaśāstric use 
suggests that it was not the Vedic but the “community standards,” prevalent 
in different regions and communities, that were taken to constitute dharma. 
The early texts on dharma speak of the dharma of regions, castes, and 
families. These texts regard dharma as multiple and varied; each of these 
kinds of dharma can hardly be expected to be based on the Veda. Recent 
scholarship has demonstrated that the early texts on law were basically 
records of such community standards or local customs. 
 
This then leads to the final statement, already cited above, that it is a convenient 
theological fiction to claim that the Veda is the source of all dharma. Quite so, but 
the critical word here is simply the little word ‘all’. Lawyers should be extra 
careful about such little words. 
 In an internally pluralist scenario, marked in addition by the competitive co-
existence of Buddhist, Jaina and Hindu laws, and probably quite a few other forms 
of law, we should imagine what current South African pluralist scholarship has 
described as a huge pot, in which the stew of law is slowly cooking and in which 
all sorts of ingredients influence the flavour of the other elements. Something like 
this South African pot food, as Professor Christa Rautenbach described it to us in a 
lecture at SOAS in November 2008, was in its late Vedic manifestation a scenario 
in which various religious and ethical conceptualisations and expectations 
competed and co-existed. So what we find again is not an either/or scenario, but the 
typical legal pluralist scenario of co-existence, competition, and mutual 
enrichment. I do not think there is any problem with acknowledging that the 
trajectory of late Vedic Hindu law was significantly influenced by Buddhist, Jaina 
WERNER MENSKI           38 
 
and other elements. The pluralist interactions will have gone on, the cross-
fertilisations continued. They probably continue even today. 
 I note finally that, very appropriately, Olivelle as cited above has highlighted 
the influence of local custom on the emerging dharmaśāstra corpus. Here is where 
we re-connect and where the conceptual shift from rita to dharma occurs, all along 
powered by the engine of karma concepts as a dynamising influence. Citing Kane 
and Lingat, I have shown how the gradual shift from natural law towards socio-
legal concerns may have occurred (Menski, 2003: 96-9). It has also been made 
clear and is uncontested that these were idealising assumptions, and that social 
reality may have been very different. Here, I wish to highlight that Olivelle’s 
emphasis on the critical importance of customary norms is precisely reflected and 
replicated in my analysis (Menski, 2003: 125) of how Manusmriti 2.6 and 2.12 deal 
with the question of the sources of dharma. So there is no reason to be nervous 
about scholarly politics any more – we seem to be singing from the same hymn 
sheets. 
 By finding that in socio-legal reality ‘classical’ Hindu law’s process of 
ascertaining dharma starts in the individual mind and not in a book of law, Vedic 
or later, I am highlighting that Lingat (1973), as a legal positivist of the French 
civil law tradition, failed to see the socio-legal and even psychological flexibility 
that Olivelle (2006a) so readily accepts. What needs to be clarified now, I feel, is 
how this matches with the research findings by Olivelle that suggest that texts like 
the Manusmriti turned into virtual codes of law. I believe that Olivelle himself is 
saying that this assumption is a constructed one and not the only vision or 
perspective on this subject.  
 So there was heavily contested Vedic legal pluralism as a fact, which means that 
the trajectory of early Hindu law is not slavishly dependent only on Vedic texts or 
Vedic law, and is neither exclusively religious, nor devoid of religious connections. 
Sanskrit law is itself, as reflected in the rich terminology, a ‘pop’ structure, a 
plurality of pluralities that needed to be managed at all times. It was and is indeed a 
very colourful kite in the sky of global laws. 
 
 
Postscript: Is this relevant for Hindu law today? 
 
Jumping millennia, I pull together the key strands of this paper by just emphasising 
that the realities of pluralist discourse over the ‘right’ way to do all manner of 
things in Vedic times, and to believe various things in connection with Vedic 
‘roots’, are replicated in today’s attempts to hold a plural nation like India together 
by constructing terms like ‘composite culture (Chandra and Mahajan, 2007). This 
term was written into Article 51-A(f) of the Indian Constitution of 1950, in an 
amazingly culture-specific set of amendments introduced with effect from 3 
January 1977, the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976. There are 
many reasons to assume that this set of amendments re-invigorated certain 
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principles of ancient Hindu jurisprudence in post-colonial India’s desperate search 
for ‘the right law’. 
 The partly violent debates that Sanskritists can excavate from the ancient texts, 
and their various shades of meanings, remain crucially relevant in today’s conflict-
ridden world and specifically in South Asian discourses about violence and the 
management of diversity. All the terms identified here as ingredients in the verbal 
stew of Sanskrit law are still there today, some more openly and more prominent 
than others, some with changed tastes and flavours. But it could not be said that 
such antiquarian research is merely an ivory-tower occupation that cash-strapped 
governments might be tempted to close down because such ancient concepts have 
no relevance today. Writing this article reinforced my conviction that there is a 
future for Sanskrit Law Studies also in relation to current legal developments in 
this ‘glocal’ world. We are as comparative lawyers clearly shooting ourselves in 
the foot if we are afraid of ‘religion’ or ‘natural law’ and pretend or claim that 
entities like Sanskrit Law have nothing to do with Nature, ‘religion’ or with 
reconstructed ‘Hindu’ elements. As a pluralist entity, and a culture-specific 
manifestation of law, early Sanskrit law necessarily involved and still involves both 
the religious and the secular. As elsewhere, the most interesting and legally 
productive elements are the rich evidence of boundary crossing and cross-
fertilisations within this pluralist scenario, in time and space, and thus in Vedic 
times in India as much as all over the globe today. 
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1 This article is a revised version of a paper presented in Panel 15 of the 14th International 
Sanskrit Conference in Kyoto, 1-5 September 2009. I am grateful to Patrick Olivelle and 
Donald Davis Jr. for including it in this panel and for some critical comments. 
2 A key example that I stumbled upon in my doctoral thesis many years ago (Menski, 1984) 
is the change from punah in Rgveda 10.85.41 to sanah in Atharvaveda 14.2.1. This 
puzzling minor textual variation reflects a critical change in ancient Hindu marriage rituals 
and emphasises the dramatic involvement of priests in such late Vedic rituals, which quite 
soon turned out to be too risky to handle, because it involved magic pollutions by the bridal 
blood of the first night. Today such ritual elements are avoided by Hindu priests and are 
instead handled by women through locally coloured symbolisms and rituals. It took me six 
months to understand the reasons for this modification and to crack this nut. 
3 The same will of course need to be said about Islamic law and other legal systems. I raise 
this point here to highlight that scholarship in ancient Vedic law retains enormous current 
relevance for modern states and for comparative analysis, especially in the current age of 
panic about ‘religion’. To focus only on Islamic legal issues in such debates would be a 
grave error of judgment and of policy. To reduce public funding for Indic research in 
whatever form is thus extremely short-sighted if one wants to combat ‘terror’ in its various 
forms. 
4 Over the past few years, my students have come up with various other pluralist models of 
law, wedding cakes with layers, ice cream cones with different flavours, snowflakes, giant 
spider webs, even a computerised image of the God of Law as a spaghetti monster. 
Blasphemous thoughts for some, indeed, but Vedic Indians were clearly used to 
blasphemous thoughts.  
5 The ritual of seven steps in the most ancient grihyasūtra texts that include this ritual (not 
the Vedas) implies that at the end of the rituals the couple walk away from the fire, not 
around it. 
6 Indeed, during the discussion in Kyoto, she bluntly stated that she was not interested in 
religion. 
7 Chiba (1986) spoke of ‘official law, ‘unofficial law’ and ‘legal postulates’, a terminology 
which I decoded as references to legal positivism, socio-cultural norms and various forms 
of natural law (Menski, 2006). The fourth element now is international law, leading to kite-
like structures (Menski, 2009). 
8 Griffith (1968, II: 159) translated ‘upheld’ instead of ‘sustained’ for the same Sanskrit 
verse, which, we should note,  is also Atharvaveda 14.1.1, the start of another, but very 
different marriage-related Vedic text (Menski, 1984). 
 
